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in his 2011 book, Paul Turpin, assistant Professor of communication at the 
university of the Pacific, usa, analyzes the idea of justice embedded in what he 
calls “the moral rhetoric” that underlies the work of two great economic theorists, 
adam smith and milton friedman, both belonging to the liberal tradition.
according to Turpin, the “moral rhetoric” is nothing else than the persuasive 
discourse that can be found in economic theories, which uses praise and blame in 
order to (re)enforce certain ideas and norms that constitute the basis of organization 
and functioning of the economy. The very persuasiveness of these concepts, ideas and 
norms is the force that keeps the economic system in motion, so “an understanding 
of the workings of rhetoric helps us understand how language of praise and blame 
functions to construct a decorum – a set of norms of appropriateness – that creates 
a picture of how people ought to stand in relation to one another, including what 
their possibilities for action and communication are in given situations.” (p. 2) The 
birth of modern economic theory, identified with the work of adam smith, means 
for Turpin the transition from an old decorum, which had at its core a specific idea 
of justice, namely distributive justice, concerned with what the community owes 
to the individual, to a new, liberal decorum, centered in the idea of “commutative 
justice”, or justice in exchange. consequently, he critically examines three essential 
works of political economy, adam smith’s (1759) Theory of moral sentiments (in 
chapter 2) and (1776) Wealth of nations (in chapter 3), and milton friedman’s 
(1962) capitalism and freedom (in chapter 4), in order to “trace in all three works The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 3
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the presence of a moral rhetoric: language of praise and blame used to portray 
character and ascribe motivations.” (p. 8)
The persuasive aspect of rhetoric must not be understood as referring to its 
manipulative force, intended to make people perform some specific actions intended 
by the manipulator, but rather to the practical function of discourse to help finding 
solutions for actual problems in conditions of contingent judgement. The critique of 
smith’s and friedman’s use of moral rhetoric does not mean that Turpin maintains 
that they are or intend to be manipulative (in the sense that they try to deceive 
somebody or conceal something), but instead he attempts to discover how they would 
want their readers to understand certain situations and actions, how to evaluate 
states of fact and persons, or what Weltanschauung they try to construct for their 
audience. he does so by pointing out that their discourse consists of more than 
economic science, being “saturated with moral judgments that are essential to the 
persuasive justifications for trusting the market, justifications that are fundamental 
to liberal political economy.” (p. 8)
according to Turpin, an economic system (such as the self-regulating free market 
system) can only function if people share an attitude of trust in its fundamental 
values and principles (as described by both adam smith and friedman), and act as 
if persuaded by their truth. To share such an attitude of trust means to be part of 
a discourse community, together with people that have the same Weltanschauung, 
the same way of understanding the (economic) world. in this sense, for Turpin, 
discourse communities are to be seen not only as including people with the same way 
of understanding the world (the same “decorum”), that is with identical theoretical 
concerns and views, but also as communities of interest. The persuasive rhetoric that 
can be identified in smith’s and friedman’s moral arguments must be seen as an 
invitation for their readers into a discourse community, not only because they may 
convince them of the truth of the liberal economic ideas and arguments, but also 
because they can change their fundamental attitudes and beliefs.
The transition to the modern, liberal economic decorum means also the creation 
of a new discourse community, where the traditional image of an economy based 
on distributive justice is replaced by the concept of a market economy grounded in 
commutative justice. as the new paradigm gained in power and influence, argues 
Turpin, the idea of distributive justice became increasingly obsolete and irrelevant, 
and consequently its function of relational coordination of society was left to be 
fulfilled by the former. That means that people began to understand each other and 
the fundamental relations between them in society exclusively from the point of The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 4
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view of the new idea of commutative justice. This new way of thinking transformed 
the very idea of distributive justice that came to be understood as merely the 
material distribution of goods. according to Turpin, this transformation has three 
negative consequences: “(1) it separates material distribution from a relational 
framework; (2) it puts an undue relational burden on the ordinary social decorum; 
and (3) it develops a market decorum that increasingly and ironically threatens 
commutative justice itself.” (p. 4)
The first undesired consequence means that if we conceive distribution exclusively 
through the lens of distribution of material goods, then welfare actions will be 
accompanied by an attitude of contempt towards the receiver. The second one is that 
the rules of social behavior came to be structured on the model of market relations, 
and that fact lowers the standards of what is considered to be appropriate in social 
relations. The third negative consequence concerns market decorum, i.e. the general 
rules of what means the right way to do business, rules that have changed under 
the pressure of the preeminence of the market. That means not only a change in 
the conception about what the behavior of agents in the market should be in order 
to meet the standards of appropriateness, but also a change in the criteria of social 
acceptance and recognition: to be worthy of social praise, one must be successful in 
the market. consequently, the market becomes not only the place where people can 
satisfy their self-interest, but also the context where they gain social recognition, 
and as a consequence, market principles become the ultimate criteria of guiding 
one’s life.
This situation must not make us think that Turpin believes that market economies 
are completely evil, or that we should somehow try to switch to a new system, 
without markets, for this is not possible. he means only that, by making us believe 
that commutative justice is the only one that is important, the moral rhetoric 
of market economists has distorted our understanding not only of the market 
principles, but also of the idea of justice, be it commutative or distributional. The 
idea of distributive justice itself cannot function normally anymore, because this 
type of justice is now understood in separation from the context of human relations 
in society.
Given this situation, what, if anything, can be done to alleviate those bad 
consequences that can be felt by every member of the discourse (and interest) 
community built on this moral rhetoric? Turpin believes that we should try to find 
ways for people to overcome the feeling of social and cultural fragmentation, to The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 5
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regain social recognition, respect and solidarity, and to rethink justice in relational 
terms “insofar as those terms invoke attention to people as they are actually 
situated and are not reduced to admiration for achievement as in the commutative 
– distributional paradigm. These qualifiers suggest that respect and recognition 
must occupy ground somewhere between a general respect for people on the basis of 
their humanity and esteem for a specific achievement, if respect and recognition are 
to successfully manifest the relational imperatives of distributive justice” (p. 90). 
according to Turpin, modern people’s feelings of excessive pluralism, fragmentation 
and alienation were induced by the neglect of relational issues and by denying 
distributive justice its social importance. The result is that we do not have any more 
a proper context of recognition of different value orientations. on the one hand, we 
are taught that we must have respect for humanity as present in every person, and 
on the other hand we are supposed to have esteem for the excellence of particular 
persons. But, as Turpin puts it, “recognition as a human being is too abstract. 
recognition through esteem is too particular.” (p. 106) We need to understand that 
recognition starts from real people as they actually are, and ultimately induces in 
human beings a feeling of belonging, of being members of a community, despite the 
inherent differences between them. recognition itself has an inherently rhetorical 
dynamic, and the way to achieve solidarity in a social community is precisely the 
rhetoric understood as attitudinal reasoning within the discourse community, but at 
the same time “for recognition to revive a relational distributive justice, it needs to 
be of a kind that lets persons be who they are” (p. 106)
Turpin is a professor of communication, so his approach could have been limited 
to an analysis of discourse and of the elements of rhetoric that can be found in the 
work of the two great liberal economists, smith and friedman. instead, his book 
presents a multidisciplinary perspective that proves expertise in both economy and 
philosophy, and can be a useful reading for scholars in those fields, as well as for 
those interested in the general problem of justice and its moral, economic, social and 
rhetoric implications.
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